Russia is being considered as a potential player in a deal to halt the conflict raging between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah movement, leveraging its unique position to prevent an even larger-scale war from erupting across a region consumed by crisis for more than a year.
As a ceasefire agreement is drafted with the backing of U.S. presidential advisers Amos Hochstein and Brett McGurk, international outlets such as Israel’s Ynet News and the Saudi-owned, United Kingdom-based Asharq Al-Awsat have cited sources in recent days saying that Russia has been asked by Israel to take part in the arrangement.
Uncertainties surround Moscow’s capacity to play an effective role as it contends with a war of its own in Ukraine, but the buy-in of a world power with ties to nearly every major stakeholder could provide crucial support to the initiative at a time when Washington’s leadership in the Middle East has been increasingly called into question.
“We always prefer the Americans,” Orna Mizrahi, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser now serving as senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, told Newsweek. “But we understand that, because of [the Russians’] really good relations nowadays with the Iranians, maybe they can provide something that will contribute to this for the stability of any arrangement in the future.
“Another point is the fact that they are part of the United Nations Security Council five and if we get to the point that we have some kind of a new resolution about the ceasefire in the United Nations Security Council, we would like that the Russians will approve it.”
Moreover, Mizrahi said the latest developments came at a time when Russia “wants to be involved, they want to be relevant to what’s going on in the region.”
A Dual Approach
Moscow has a long history of power plays in the Middle East dating back to the days of the Soviet Union, as the already ideologically fractured region emerging from its colonial era was thrust into the crosshairs of the Cold War. For decades, the USSR was a key supporter of a number of Arab states that clashed with U.S.-backed Israel in support of Palestinian statehood.
Just months before its ultimate collapse, however, the Soviet Union reestablished ties with Israel in 1991 and the newly formed Russian Federation doubled down on this path, particularly after President Vladimir Putin first came to power in 2000. Putin would go on to reassert Russia’s influence across the Middle East and take it a step further by conducting an unprecedented intervention on behalf of longtime partner Syria in the midst of its civil war in 2015.
The conflict set the stage for a substantial boost in Russia’s relationship with Iran, which also backed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad against rebels and jihadis, including the Islamic State militant group (ISIS). Moscow and Tehran have since further bolstered their partnership, with Russian forces even utilizing Iranian drones in the ongoing war in Ukraine launched by Putin in February 2022.
The Russian leader has also forged a close, personal relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These bonds have been complicated by Moscow’s increasingly harsh criticism of Israeli wartime actions in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, yet Netanyahu has rarely responded in kind and the two sides have managed to keep their channels open.
Having dealt with Russian officials directly in her past roles in government, Mizrahi testified to an “astonishing” level of “their appreciation of Israeli military capabilities,” something she said has helped drive a pragmatic approach on issues such as Syria, where advanced Russian air defenses have been silent in the face of hundreds of Israeli strikes against positions tied to Iran and its militia allies.
She said: “I think that this plays a very significant role in their policy towards Israel and this is one of the reasons that they are not doing anything against the Israeli attacks in Syria, although they could do a lot, of course.”
The region’s focus has since shifted from Syria to Gaza, however, where war erupted in October of last year following an attack led by the Palestinian Hamas movement against Israel. Even more recently, the spotlight has been on Lebanon, where the Israeli military is now waging a combined air and land campaign against Hezbollah, a close ally of Iran, over its continuous cross-border strikes in solidarity with Hamas.
Hezbollah has been dealt severe blows as a result of the conflict, including the loss of large amounts of equipment and the deaths of senior commanders, including longtime Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. But as the powerful paramilitary organization regroups and Israel and Iran reel from their recent exchange of direct strikes, the latest ceasefire talks have emerged as a potential off-ramp.
Among the discussed components of the deal, an apparent U.S. draft of which was leaked earlier this week by Israeli broadcaster Kan and confirmed by two sources cited by Reuters, is a plan to hamper the flow of weapons to Hezbollah via the presence of foreign troops at the Syria-Lebanon border.
Yeghia Tashjian, regional and international affairs cluster coordinator at the American University of Beirut’s Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, pointed out that Russia was in the best position to aid in this effort given the presence of its forces in Syria.
“Here, we should ask, is it in Russia’s interest to see Hezbollah dismantled?” Tashjian, who recently participated in a conference held by the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies discussing Moscow’s role in the Eastern Mediterranean, asked.
“Russia does not want to see Hezbollah weakened to a degree that would increase the U.S. influence in Lebanon and Syria. Hezbollah and Iran have been useful in containing the American influence,” he said. “However, instability is not in the interest of Russia if it extends to Syria.”
Allies and Competitors
Today, Tashjian said, Moscow’s attention has been diverted to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, where Putin is overseeing a massive war effort against Kyiv, which is receiving increasingly advanced aid from Washington and its NATO allies.
Tashjian said this shift was most notably demonstrated by Russia’s lack of intervention in support of ally Armenia when Azerbaijan seized control of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region last year. The large-scale offensive came just three years after the establishment of a ceasefire agreement meant to be enforced by Russian peacekeeping units.
Russia and Iran, which also borders the volatile South Caucasus region, have since diverged on their positions in the strategically located area as the former backs the opening of a corridor through Armenian territory to Azerbaijani lands and Iran opposes it.
In Syria, too, the two powers have differed in their long-term approaches, with Moscow looking to bring the war-torn nation back into the Arab fold while Tehran views it as a key component of the Axis of Resistance coalition that also includes Hezbollah and an array of other non-state actors in the region. Critical for both players is access to the Mediterranean.
“Within this context, there seems to be an agreement between Tel Aviv and Moscow that the former would not sell weapons to Kyiv and in return, Russia would close an eye for Israel’s airstrikes on Iranian and Hezbollah assets in Syria,” Tashjian said. “The weakening of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria would also provide additional flexibility for President Bashar al-Assad to open to the Gulf countries.”
The Syrian conflict has also had a profound impact in Lebanon because of refugee flows, security concerns and the often-polarizing history between the neighboring nations, among other factors. Since the end of the civil war in 1991 and the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005, Lebanon’s sectarian politics have largely been divided into two blocs, one supportive of Assad and the other opposed to him.
Iran’s influence in the country has traditionally been rooted in its close ties to fellow Shiite Muslims, predominantly Hezbollah, the dominant military force in the country and also a powerful political entity.
Russia, too, has established a rapport with Hezbollah. Moscow has also fostered support among different segments of society, including the Orthodox Christian community and other key figures such as Maronite Christian Marada Movement leader Suleiman Frangieh, who has been considered a potential candidate to assume the vacant Lebanese presidency, thus breaking a two-year deadlock.
“Its soft power over the years has built bridges with many actors both in the Christian and Muslim communities, something that Iran lacks,” Tashjian said. “Hence, the Israeli media outlets hinting on the issue that Russia is being asked and has expressed willingness to play a role in a ceasefire in Lebanon means we may see greater Russian involvement in Lebanon, at the expense of Iran.”
“I am not sure if the U.S. will agree on such an idea,” he added. “This depends on the future administration in Washington and its willingness to compartmentalize its relations with Moscow.”
Reached for comment, a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department told Newsweek that “we don’t have comment on Russian diplomatic efforts” and spoke instead to the U.S. approach to the ongoing talks.
“The United States is committed to regional stability,” the State Department spokesperson said. “We continue to support a diplomatic solution to current hostilities between Israel and Hizballah—one that restores lasting calm and allows residents in both countries to return safely to their homes.”
Newsweek has also reached out to the Lebanese Embassy to the U.S., the Israeli Consulate General in New York, the Iranian Mission to the United Nations and the Russian Foreign Ministry for comment.
A Precarious Pivot
Mona Yacoubian, a former U.S. State Department analyst now serving as vice president of the United States Institute of Peace’s Middle East and North Africa center, expressed doubts regarding Russia’s potential to play a major role in the outcome of the conflict in Lebanon.
“Russia’s strategy in Lebanon has largely been opportunistic, seeking to exploit opportunities wherever they arise without investing significant resources,” Yacoubian told Newsweek. “As such, Moscow’s influence in Lebanon is fairly limited and certainly pales in comparison to the role it plays in Syria.”
Unlike in Syria, where Russia capitalized on a Cold War-era relationship with the central government to great effect, Lebanon’s complex constellation of sectarian factions would demand a more comprehensive campaign of maneuvering.
“Under the current circumstances, it’s difficult to imagine Russia exploiting the current crisis to play a bigger role in Lebanon,” Yacoubian said. “It does not have the requisite influence across Lebanon’s political spectrum, leverage among key regional players or leading influence in the United Nations to take on ceasefire diplomacy in Lebanon.”
While Russia’s soft power moves have gained a degree of foothold in Lebanon, Moscow’s more ambitious projects have had mixed results.
In 2018, Russia offered a $5 billion military assistance deal to Lebanon only for the agreement to later be turned down amid U.S. and European pressure. That same year, Russian energy giants Novatek and Rosneft signed contracts for the exploration of Lebanese maritime gas fields but the former ultimately ceded the contract to QatarEnergy last year amid Western sanctions over the war in Ukraine.
Karim Emile Bitar, a professor of international relations at Saint Joseph University of Beirut, also felt the major players in Lebanon at this stage remained the U.S., Iran and Saudi Arabia, which continues to hold the greatest influence among the Sunni Muslim community in Lebanon amid competition with another regional player, Turkey.
He told Newsweek that Moscow and Ankara do exert degrees of influence in Lebanon “but they cannot be considered as key stakeholders, unless the solution to the Israeli-Lebanese war is part of a wider package deal that would involve a detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, between the United States and Iran, and if it includes the Syrian dossier, if Bashar al-Assad can be forced to make certain concessions.”
“In that case, Putin could be a broker, a middleman between the Sunni Arab states and Bashar al-Assad,” he said.
Still, as Russian International Affairs Council expert Kirill Semenov told Newsweek: “Russia does not cease to conduct dialogue with Lebanese political forces.” He said the current discussions come as “Moscow is trying to understand Israel’s motives in order to find common ground between them in order to develop a formula for a possible ceasefire.”
Others, too, would need to be convinced of the final initiative.
“Moscow’s efforts alone on this track will not be enough and informal consultations with Western countries are necessary, as well as close coordination with Moscow’s Arab partners, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE,” Semenov said.
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have called for a ceasefire since the regional crisis first erupted more than a year ago, but they have so far been hesitant to play a larger role. Moscow has had success in the past on this front, however, notably playing a significant part in mending their ties with Damascus, which returned to the Arab League last year after being shut out at the onset of the civil war in 2011.
Assad’s comeback on the battlefield and diplomatic arena with help from Moscow was widely viewed as a victory against Washington’s waning influence in the region. But replicating this win in Lebanon may prove an even bigger challenge for the Kremlin, even with the many inroads it has sought to foster.
“Moscow and Beirut maintain close relations and contacts, just as Russia maintains relations with various political forces in the country, both with Hezbollah’s allies and opponents, so Russia still has certain levers of influence in Lebanon,” Semenov said. “But they are limited.
“Nevertheless, many political forces in Lebanon are ready to listen to Moscow’s advice but this does not mean that they will follow this advice.”
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